Appendix

Table A1: Distribution of tribe-affiliated voters by electoral distict, 2016. Source: Al-Haqiqa, 2015. Other* includes Dawsari Sabiya, Harb, Sulba, Al-Murra, Harshan, Adawin, Al Dool, Qahtan, Bani Khalid.

District	1	2	3	4	5
ʿ**Azimi**	9000	1800	515	4030	30000
Mutayri	320	1240	1420	28950	8100
Rushayda	400	1190	830	22200	2000
ʿ**Ajman**	400				22370
ʿ**Anaza**		3250	1045	14660	3795
ʿ**Utayba**	530		3510	2385	9430
Shammar		1400	490	9120	2450
Dhufayr		615	325	8900	
Bani Hajar			425		8150
Other*		6530		4750	13825

Robustness Checks and Regressions

Of particular interest in the full regressions (Table 5 in the Appendix) is the positive association between respondents' memberships in group organizations and higher rates of political participation (but also greater deference to the Kuwaiti government). This is perhaps not a surprising finding, given the extensive discussion of the role that associational life can play in "making democracy work."[1] Still, we explore whether this associational role varies across tribal/non-tribal areas by including an interaction term between the indicator for Jahra and Ahmadi and our measure of respondents' associational life.

These regressions suggest that while Sunni Kuwaitis from more tribal regions were more likely to vote in 2013 than their counterparts in other regions (on average), more socially engaged citizens from predominantly tribal regions were less likely to vote than their engaged counterparts from other governorates; we observe no difference in terms of likelihood of attending a campaign event, however (Regressions 4 and 6, Table 5 in the appendix). This could reflect the fact that this survey was conducted in 2013, when many political blocs linked to the political opposition boycotted the elections after the imposition of the SNTV system.

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[1] Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

Table A2: Full regression table for political attitudes and participation according to region of residence (Jahra and Ahmadi as "tribal" areas). Logistic regressions with robust standard errors.

	Transactional	Background impt.	Voted 2013		Campaign event 2013		Defer to gov't
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Age	−0.02*	0.003	0.07***	0.07***	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Tribal region	0.25	0.003	0.03	0.64*	0.15	0.30	0.05
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.33)	(0.20)	(0.32)	(0.20)
Associationalism	0.50***	−0.18**	0.25***	0.42***	0.71***	0.76***	−0.16**
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.07)
Grievance	−0.20	−0.23**	−0.38**	−0.42***	−0.08	−0.11	−0.96***
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.12)
College	0.40	−0.41*	0.78***	0.78***	0.06	0.06	−0.86***
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Secondary	0.16	−0.07	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	−0.46*
	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Needs met and can save	−0.11	0.47	0.004	0.01	−0.12	−0.12	0.04
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Needs met	−0.14	0.55**	−0.04	−0.07	−0.04	−0.05	0.07
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.27)
Female	−0.10	−0.12	0.002	0.01	0.19	0.19	−0.35*
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Tribal region x Grievance			−0.08		−0.07		
			(0.20)		(0.20)		
Tribal region x Assn.				−0.36**		−0.09	
				(0.14)		(0.15)	
Constant	−1.37***	−0.32	−2.53***	−2.83***	−1.49***	−1.56***	0.64
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.52)	(0.54)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.47)
Observations	541	475	536	536	541	541	531
Log Likelihood	−294.10	−314.19	−309.00	−305.95	−319.69	−319.58	−307.63
Akaike Inf. Crit.	608.21	648.39	640.01	633.89	661.39	661.16	635.26

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A3: Full regression table for political attitudes and participation according to region of residence (Jahra and Ahmadi as "tribal" areas), this time including Farwaniyah region. Logistic regressions with robust standard errors.

	Dependent variable:						
	Transactional	Background impt.	Voted 2013		Campaign event 2013		Defer to gov't
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Age	−0.01	−0.004	0.07***	0.07***	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Tribal region	0.30*	−0.08	0.002	0.53*	0.10	0.46	0.21
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.30)	(0.17)	(0.29)	(0.18)
Associationalism	0.48***	−0.14**	0.25***	0.43***	0.64***	0.76***	−0.13**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.06)
Grievance	−0.26**	−0.23**	−0.38**	−0.42***	−0.09	−0.13	−0.95***
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.10)
College	0.32	−0.35	0.64***	0.63***	0.03	0.02	−0.87***
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Secondary	0.05	−0.16	−0.01	0.01	0.12	0.13	−0.49**
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Needs met and can save	−0.19	0.37	0.02	0.01	−0.07	−0.08	−0.16
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Needs met	−0.35	0.49*	0.07	0.04	0.09	0.07	0.03
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Female	0.04	−0.02	0.08	0.10	0.21	0.22	−0.26
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Tribal region x Grievance				−0.07		−0.07	
				(0.18)		(0.17)	
Tribal region x Assn.				−0.32**		−0.22	
				(0.13)		(0.14)	
Constant	−1.60***	−0.11	−2.71***	−3.03***	−1.60***	−1.82***	0.74*
	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.50)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.43)
Observations	677	591	672	672	677	677	665
Log Likelihood	−377.14	−391.91	−390.22	−387.45	−412.61	−411.44	−380.51
Akaike Inf. Crit.	774.28	803.82	802.44	796.89	847.22	844.89	781.03

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A4: OLS regressions of effective number of candidates on the number of candidates, electoral rule in use (with 5-district, 4-vote system as baseline category), the number of elections since the last change in electoral rule, and the interaction of the number of candidates with each of the other variables. Only interaction terms are reported as the main quantities of interest. Robust standard errors clustered by tribe.

| | Effective # of Candidates | | | |
	All	Largest	Mid-sized	Smaller
Candidates	0.52***	0.34***	0.35***	0.35***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Candidates x 25-district	0.21***	0.39***	0.09	−0.13
	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.17)	(0.08)
Candidates x SNTV	0.05	0.25***	−0.01	−0.10
	(0.07)	(0.001)	(0.05)	(0.12)
Candidates x Time	−0.01	−0.07***	0.09***	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Constant	0.38***	2.59***	1.43**	0.60***
	(0.14)	(0.36)	(0.64)	(0.11)
Observations	135	20	35	80
R^2	0.91	0.97	0.81	0.54
Adjusted R^2	0.90	0.96	0.76	0.50

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01