

Appendix

June 8, 2023

Supplemental regression tables for Andrew Leber, Christopher Carothers, and Matthew Reichert. "When can dictators go it alone? Personalization and oversight in authoritarian regimes." *Politics & Society* 51, no. 1 (2023): 66-107.

Table 1: Robustness Checks, Alternative Explanations (Logistic Regressions)
 - pg. 81

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Personalization									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Oversight	-2.669*** (0.773)	-3.578*** (0.773)	-2.714*** (0.907)	-2.840*** (0.839)	-2.684*** (0.831)	-2.629*** (0.735)	-2.304*** (0.779)	-2.576*** (0.751)	-3.748*** (0.930)	-2.473*** (0.748)
GDP p.c. (logged)			0.270 (0.338)	0.243 (0.388)						
Econ. Growth			0.009 (0.048)							
Econ. Crisis			0.477 (0.735)							
Fuel rents p.c. (logged)				0.002 (0.149)						
Judicial Con.					-1.938 (2.249)					
Legis. Con					1.746 (1.901)					
X-Con						-0.340 (0.321)				
Prior Person.							2.186 (1.402)			
Prior Democracy								-1.102 (1.116)		
Duration									0.038** (0.019)	
Age										-0.054 (0.037)
Western Ed.										-1.495* (0.826)
Constant	0.435 (0.490)	-0.582 (0.490)	-2.111 (3.011)	-1.611 (3.066)	0.595 (0.587)	1.241 (0.834)	-0.552 (0.750)	0.517 (0.411)	-0.281 (0.539)	3.678* (2.095)
Region FX		✓								
Decade FX		✓								
Observations	59	59	59	59	58	59	53	59	59	59
Log Likelihood	-28.616	-23.390	-28.051	-28.259	-27.943	-27.877	-25.168	-28.150	-26.548	-26.346

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: Robustness Checks, Alternative Explanations (Continuous DV) -
pg. 81

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	person_score									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Oversight	-0.406*** (0.100)	-0.408*** (0.100)	-0.399*** (0.101)	-0.423*** (0.100)	-0.406*** (0.100)	-0.388*** (0.092)	-0.333*** (0.101)	-0.387*** (0.092)	-0.511*** (0.079)	-0.350*** (0.100)
GDP p.c. (logged)			0.027 (0.038)	0.040 (0.044)						
Econ. Growth			0.004 (0.008)							
Econ. Crisis			0.078 (0.091)							
Fuel rents p.c. (logged)				-0.006 (0.021)						
Judicial Con.					-0.409 (0.256)					
Legis. Con.					0.333 (0.207)					
X-Con.						-0.054 (0.043)				
Prior Personalization							0.388** (0.173)			
Prior Democracy								-0.124 (0.089)		
Duration									0.005** (0.002)	
Age										-0.006 (0.005)
Western Ed.										-0.118 (0.088)
Constant	0.527*** (0.092)	0.361*** (0.092)	0.241 (0.341)	0.213 (0.348)	0.566*** (0.092)	0.652*** (0.119)	0.340*** (0.112)	0.536*** (0.074)	0.424*** (0.090)	0.861*** (0.266)
Observations	59	59	59	59	58	59	53	59	59	59
R ²	0.283	0.426	0.300	0.292	0.320	0.309	0.344	0.296	0.343	0.318
Residual Std. Error	0.329 (df = 57)	0.311 (df = 51)	0.333 (df = 54)	0.332 (df = 55)	0.329 (df = 54)	0.325 (df = 56)	0.327 (df = 50)	0.328 (df = 56)	0.317 (df = 56)	0.326 (df = 55)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3: Origins of Oversight, OLS Regressions with HC1 Standard Errors
(pgs. 83, 84)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Oversight							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GDP p.c. (logged)	0.053 (0.056)	0.128* (0.074)						
Econ. Growth	0.002 (0.008)							
Econ. Crisis	-0.371** (0.145)							
Fuel rents p.c. (logged)		-0.022 (0.026)						
Judicial Con.			0.254 (0.401)					
Legis. Con.			0.142 (0.348)					
X-Con.				0.060 (0.060)				
Prior Personalization					-0.569*** (0.219)			
Prior Democracy						0.298* (0.158)		
Duration							0.011*** (0.003)	
Age								0.016*** (0.005)
Western Ed.								0.146 (0.143)
Constant	0.199 (0.527)	-0.478 (0.608)	0.399*** (0.116)	0.375** (0.162)	0.730*** (0.107)	0.480*** (0.072)	0.162* (0.093)	-0.428 (0.335)
Observations	59	59	58	59	53	59	59	59
R ²	0.169	0.052	0.029	0.020	0.110	0.046	0.242	0.153
Adjusted R ²	0.124	0.019	-0.007	0.002	0.093	0.029	0.229	0.122
Residual Std. Error	0.471 (df = 55)	0.499 (df = 56)	0.506 (df = 55)	0.503 (df = 57)	0.481 (df = 51)	0.496 (df = 57)	0.442 (df = 57)	0.472 (df = 56)
F Statistic	3.736** (df = 3; 55)	1.549 (df = 2; 56)	0.813 (df = 2; 55)	1.138 (df = 1; 57)	6.315** (df = 1; 51)	2.747 (df = 1; 57)	18.191*** (df = 1; 57)	5.047*** (df = 2; 56)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01